Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What Causes Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)–A Recomendation to Whittle Away the Liberal Application of Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain Names by Caudill, Matthew D.
Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law 
Journal 
Volume 13 Volume XIII 
Number 1 Volume XIII Book 1 Article 5 
2002 
Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What Causes Dilution Under 15 
U.S.C. 1125(c)–A Recomendation to Whittle Away the Liberal 
Application of Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain Names 
Matthew D. Caudill 
Goodwin Procter LLP (New York, NY), mcaudill@goodwinprocter.com 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj 
 Part of the Entertainment, Arts, and Sports Law Commons, and the Intellectual Property Law 
Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Matthew D. Caudill, Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What Causes Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)–A 
Recomendation to Whittle Away the Liberal Application of Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain Names, 
13 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 231 (2002). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol13/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal 
by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, 
please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What Causes Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. 1125(c)–A 
Recomendation to Whittle Away the Liberal Application of Trademark Dilution to 
Internet Domain Names 
Cover Page Footnote 
The author would like to thank Andrew Zidel and Kristen Papathomas for reading and commenting on 
earlier drafts of this Article. 
This article is available in Fordham Intellectual Property, Media and Entertainment Law Journal: 
https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/iplj/vol13/iss1/5 
© 2002 
 Fordham Intellectual Property, Media & Entertainment Law Journal and 
Matthew D. Caudill 
 
231 
Beyond the Cheese: Discerning What 
Causes Dilution Under 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(c)A Recommendation to Whittle 
Away the Liberal Application of 
Trademark Dilution to Internet Domain 
Names 
Matthew D. Caudill* 
What do you call a phenomenon that cannot be seen, 
measured, or otherwise perceived or detected and that, 
for sixty-five years, has proven wholly resistant to 
analysis?  In intellectual property law, it is known as 
dilution. 
Jonathan E. Moskin1 
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INTRODUCTION 
Trademark2 law emerged as a means to protect against 
consumer confusion and reward investments in product quality.3  
 
2 A trademark 
includes any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) 
used by a person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in 
commerce and applies to register on the principal register established by this 
[Act], to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a unique product, 
from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the source of the 
goods, even if that source is unknown. 
15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000).  The Lanham Act is the federal trademark statute. Act of July 5, 
1946, ch. 540, 60 Stat. 427 (1946) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. §§ 10511127 
(2000)).  The Commerce Clause affords Congress the ability to regulate trademarks and 
acts of unfair competition affecting interstate commerce. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
For the purposes of this Article, the terms trademark and mark as used herein shall 
refer to both trademarks and service marks (as well as collective and certification marks) 
without distinction.  A service mark is 
any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof(1) used by a 
person, or (2) which a person has a bona fide intention to use in commerce and 
applies to register on the principal register established by this [Act], to identify 
and distinguish the services of one person, including a unique service, from the 
services of others and to indicate the source of the services, even if that source 
is unknown.  Titles, character names, and other distinctive features of radio or 
television programs may be registered as service marks notwithstanding that 
they, or the programs, may advertise the goods of the sponsor. 
15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
3 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 
YALE L.J. 1687, 1688 (1999). 
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The protection afforded the users of distinctive marks4 evolved 
from the markings affixed to goods so as to indicate origin or 
ownership.5  Whereas utility promoted quality and prevented 
piracy 400 years ago, the purposes of modern trademark protection 
may not be the same as its roots.6 
 
4 A mark is distinctive if 
the designation is inherently distinctive, in that, because of the nature of the 
designation and the context in which it is used, prospective purchasers are 
likely to perceive it as a designation that, in the case of a trademark, identifies 
goods or services produced or sponsored by a particular person, whether known 
or anonymous, or in the case of a trade name, identifies the business or other 
enterprise of a particular person, whether known or anonymous, or in the case 
of a collective mark, identifies members of the collective group or goods or 
services produced or sponsored by members, or in the case of certification 
mark, identifies the certified goods or services; or 
the designation, although not inherently distinctive, has become distinctive, 
in that, as a result of its use, prospective purchasers have come to perceive it as 
a designation that identifies goods, services, businesses, or members in the 
manner described in Subsection (a).  Such acquired distinctiveness is 
commonly referred to as secondary meaning. 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 13 (1995) [hereinafter RESTATEMENT]. 
A mark is generally protected in a manner proportional to its distinctiveness. See 
Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976) (Arrayed 
in an ascending order which roughly reflects their eligibility to trademark status and the 
degree of protection accorded, these classes are (1) generic, (2) descriptive, (3) 
suggestive, and (4) arbitrary or fanciful.).  Generic marks, such as car for an 
automobile, are ineligible for protection because such words merely name the object or 
class to which the mark applies. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 191 F.3d 208, 215 (2d 
Cir. 1999) [hereinafter Nabisco II].  Descriptive marks merely describe the attributes of a 
product.  For instance, the mark sticky for glue would be descriptive of the texture of 
the product. See id.  Descriptive marks must acquire secondary meaning to be eligible for 
trademark protection. Id.  A mark acquires secondary meaning when the consuming 
public associates such mark with the products of its user rather than, or in addition to, its 
customary meaning. Id.  Suggestive marks merely suggest the qualities of the product and 
are thus protectable without a showing of secondary meaning. Id.  For example, 
Tanaway for suntan oil is suggestive of the effect of the product.  Arbitrary or fanciful 
marks enjoy the highest level of protection. See id. at 216.  Such marks bear no logical 
relationship between the mark and its product. See id.  Kodak for camera equipment 
and Aunt Jemima for pancake syrup are examples of arbitrary or fanciful marks. See id. 
5 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARV. L. 
REV. 813, 814 (1927).  Merchants also placed proprietary marks on their goods to prevent 
piracy or in case of shipwreck so that the goods could be identified and reclaimed by the 
owner. Id. 
6 Id.  Professor Schechter commented: 
To what extent does the trademark of today really function as either [indicating 
origin or ownership of the goods to which it is affixed]?  Actually, not in the 
least!  It has been repeatedly pointed out by the very courts that insist on 
 234 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:231 
Modern trademarks promote product quality and thereby 
stimulate product sales.7  While a trademark may manifest the 
goodwill of a product, it also may create and enhance such 
goodwill.8  A manufacturer who affixes her mark to her product is 
able to directly sway the consumer, reaching over the shoulder of 
the retailer.9  With this powerful tool, trademark owners have 
sought increased protection for their investment in product quality 
and advertising as reflected in the strength of their trademarks.10 
But not all marks are created equal.  The protection afforded 
trademarks necessarily depends upon the strength of the marks.  
The stronger the association between a trademark and a product, 
the more protection the law affords the owner of the mark.11  
Coined or fanciful marks such as Kodak12 or Aunt Jemima 
immediately bring to mind camera equipment or pancake syrup to 
the consuming public.  On the opposite end of the spectrum, 
generic marks such as Bobs Tuna may not evoke any particular 
product or product quality.  Trademark law serves to protect the 
investments in strong marks to prevent against consumer 
confusion. 
The traditional means of enforcing ones trademark was the 
infringement cause of action.  Trademark infringement occurs 
when a person uses a trademark in a way that creates a likelihood 
of confusion as to the affiliation, connection, or association of the 
 
defining trademarks in terms of ownership or origin that, owing to the 
ramifications of modern trade and the national and international distribution of 
goods from the manufacturer through the jobber or importer and the retailer to 
the consumer, the source or origin of the goods bearing a well known 
trademark is seldom known to the consumer. 
Id. (citations omitted). 
7 See David J. Franklyn, The Apparent Manufacturer Doctrine, Trademark Licensors 
and the Third Restatement of Torts, 49 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 671, 678 (1999). 
8 Schechter, supra note 5, at 81819 (The mark actually sells the goods.  And, self-
evidently, the more distinctive the mark, the more effective is its selling power.). 
9 Id. at 818. 
10 See id. at 821. 
11 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
12 One thing is for sure; a junior user should never even attempt to challenge the Kodak 
mark.  Kodak is a favorite of courts and commentators upon which to expound. See, e.g., 
Lemley, infra note 15. 
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junior user with the senior user.13  Trademark infringement serves 
to protect the public from confusion over marks that may tend to 
indicate that two competing goods derived from the same 
manufacturer.14  The application of this doctrine may seem 
apparent; one cannot legally apply the Kodak mark to camera 
products unless it actually originates (or receives consent) from the 
Eastman Kodak Company. 
While Kodak brings to mind camera equipment, it does not 
project an association with auto parts.  Certain strong trademarks 
have acquired a life of their own.  Trademark law, in turn, has as 
well.  The law of dilution protects strong trademarks against 
similar uses of the mark on non-competitive products.15  
Proponents of trademark dilution believe that the presence of 
similar marks on other goods will eventually weaken the consumer 
association with the strong mark and its product and thus blur or 
even tarnish the strong mark.16  The growth of the dilution doctrine 
in the last sixty-five years culminated with the passage of the 
Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995 (FTDA).17 
Subsequent to the passage of the FTDA, courts have 
inconsistently interpreted the causation element of the new cause 
of action.  In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,18 the Second Circuit 
held that a mere showing of a likelihood of dilution will suffice to 
grant a senior user injunctive relief, preventing a junior user from 
 
13 Courtland L. Reichman, State and Federal Trademark Dilution, 17 FRANCHISE L.J. 
111, 111 (1999).  To prevail on a trademark infringement claim, a plaintiff must show: 
(1) a protectable mark and (2) likelihood of confusion as to the origin, affiliation or 
sponsorship of the defendants product. 
14 See id. 
15 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1698 (illustrating the ideal situation wherein [d]ilution 
laws . . . [protect] against the possibility that the unique nature of a mark will be 
destroyed by companies who trade on the renown of the mark by selling unrelated goods, 
such as Kodak pianos or Buick aspirin). 
16 Thus, in a sense, while trademark infringement protects the public from confusion 
and, secondarily, the owner of the mark, trademark dilution protects the mark itself. 
William Marroletti, Dilution, Confusion, or Delusion? The Need for a Clear 
International Standard to Determine Trademark Dilution, 25 BROOK. J. INTL L. 659, 662 
(1999) (Because dilution theory protects against harm to the mark itself, rather than its 
ability to signify goods or services, it is more akin to a property-based protection.). 
17 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
18 191 F.3d 208, 22324 (2d Cir. 1999). 
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using a similar mark on a non-competitive product.19  Conversely, 
in Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah 
Division of Travel Development,20 the Fourth Circuit held that a 
plaintiff must show that a sufficiently similar junior mark must 
actually lessen the ability of the senior mark to distinguish its 
goods.21  On April 14, 2002, the U.S. Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to consider the quandary presented by this circuit split.22  
The interpretation of the FTDA in Nabisco is particularly 
troubling, in that it effectively empowers the owner of a strong 
mark to curtail the use of any similar mark in areas wherein the 
owner does not even have a market for her goods.  Rather than 
simply critique it as applied, however, this Article will analyze the 
effects of applying the Second Circuits holding in Nabisco to 
Internet23 domain names.24 
 
19 Id.  Interestingly, the Second Circuit also applied the FTDA to competing products. 
Id. 
20 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). 
21 Id. at 45859. 
22 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 
S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015) (adopting the likelihood of dilution 
analysis of the Second Circuit in Nabisco II). See infra Part II.BC. 
23 Internet refers to the worldwide information system that 
(i) is logically linked together by a globally unique address space 
based on the Internet Protocol (IP) or its subsequent 
extensions/follow-ons; 
(ii) is able to support communications using the Transmission Control 
Protocol/Internet Protocol (TCP/IP) suite or its subsequent 
extensions/follow-ons, and/or other IP-compatible protocols; and 
(iii) provides, uses or makes accessible, either publicly or privately, 
high level services layered on the communications and related 
infrastructure described herein. 
John V. Erskine, Dont Believe the HyperlinkPotential Liability of Issuers Under Anti-
Fraud Provisions of the Federal Securities Laws for Embedding Hyperlinks to Analysts 
Reports on Their Web Sites, 32 SETON HALL L. REV. 190, 190 n.1 (2001) (citing Federal 
Networking Council (FNC) Resolution: Definition of Internet, at http://www.itrd.gov/ 
fnc/Internet_res.html (last modified Oct. 30, 1995)). 
24 The domain name system [DNS] 
uses a hierarchical naming scheme known as domain names, which is similar to 
the Unix filesystem tree. The root of the DNS tree is a special node with a null 
label. The name of each node (except root) has to be up to 63 characters.  The 
domain name of any node in the tree is the list of labels, starting at that node, 
working up to the root, using a period (dot) to separate the labels (individual 
sections of a name might represent sites or a group, but the domain system 
simply calls each section a label).  The difference between the Unix filesystem 
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This Article contends that the liberal application of trademark 
dilution to trademarks associated with Internet domain names 
frustrates the original purposes of trademark protection.  The 
limited availability of means to distinguish domain names, 
compared to the traditional uses of trademarks as pictures, words, 
and other two- or three-dimensional properties affixed to products 
(i.e., logos), allows the owners of strong trademarks to exclude a 
multitude of domain names.  Rather than protecting the origin or 
ownership of a product, such application tends to produce a 
property right in gross, something trademark law should not do. 
Part I traces the evolution of the modern dilution doctrine, from 
the common law to the enactment of the FTDA.  Part II outlines 
the development of the doctrine after the FTDA, including the split 
between the federal circuits.  Part III introduces particular 
difficulties that the Internet Domain Name System (DNS) 
introduces and explores ways Congress and the courts have 
attempted to handle these difficulties.  This Article concludes by 
calling for a reexamination of the protection afforded to strong 
trademarks in the context of Internet domain names.  The rapid 
expansion of trademark dilution should halt.  Appropriate action by 
the U.S. Supreme Court in adopting the dilution causation standard 
of the Fourth Circuit25 or by Congress in repealing the FTDA as 
 
and the tree of the DNS is that in the DNS we start on the ground and go up 
till the root. Writing them in this order makes it possible to compress messages 
that contain multiple domain names.  Thus, the domain name tau.ac.il 
contains three labels: tau, ac, and il.  Any suffix of a label in a domain 
name is also called a domain. In the above example the lowest level domain is 
tau.ac.il (the domain name for the Tel-Aviv University Academic 
organization in Israel), the second level domain is ac.il (the domain name for 
Academic organizations of Israel), and the top level domain [hereinafter TLD] 
(for this name) is il (the domain name for Israel).  The node il is the second 
level node (after root). 
DNS: The Domain Name System, at http://www.rad.com/networks/1995/dns/dns.htm (last 
visited Nov. 20, 2002).  There are many top level domains [TLDs] available, including: 
.arpa, .com, .edu, .mil, .il and .us. Id.  Newer TLDs include: .aero, .biz, .coop, .info, 
.museum, .name, and .pro. Seven New TLD Proposals Selected for Introduction, at 
http://www.icann.org/tlds/ (last visited Nov. 20, 2002). 
25 The position advocated by the Solicitor General would also serve these policy 
considerations and effectively resolve the circuit split. See infra notes 175177 and 
accompanying text. 
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applied to Internet domain names would reinvigorate competition 
over the Internet. 
I. EVOLUTION OF THE MODERN DILUTION DOCTRINE 
The premise underlying trademark dilution is the inadequacy of 
trademark infringement protection.  Trademark dilution grants 
protection to strong, well-recognized marks even in the absence of 
a likelihood of confusion.26  Ostensibly, a junior user can damage 
the senior users mark without even a likelihood of consumers 
confusing the two marks.  Such use may act to diminish or dilute 
the strong identification value of the plaintiffs mark even while 
not confusing customers as to source, sponsorship, affiliation or 
connection.27 
The protection afforded thereby to a senior user derives not 
from a concern for the consuming public but for the property right 
of the senior user in his mark.  While trademark infringement 
protects the consuming public from a likelihood of confusion, 
trademark dilution protects against the gradual attenuation or 
whittling away of the value of a trademark.28  The essence of 
dilution, Professor McCarthy discerned, constitutes an invasion of 
the senior users property right in [her] mark and gives rise to an 
independent commercial tort.29 
A. State and Common Law 
Prior to the enactment of the FTDA, state law was the 
exclusive source of the dilution cause of action.  Presently, most 
states provide relief either through statute30 or common law.31  
 
26 4 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 
24:70, at 24-122 (4th ed. 2002). 
27 Id. 
28 Id. 
29 Id. (emphasis added). 
30 See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 8-12-17 (1993); ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-71-214 (Michie 2001); 
CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 14330 (West 1987); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 3313 (1993); 
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 495.151 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 10-1-451 (1994); IDAHO 
CODE § 48-113 (Michie 1997); IOWA CODE § 548.113 (1995); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
51:223.1 (West 1987); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 1530 (West 1997); MASS. ANN. 
LAWS ch. 110B, § 12 (Law. Co-op. 1995); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 333.285 (West 2001); 
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Most state dilution statutes follow the Model State Trademark Act, 
which provides: 
Likelihood of injury to business reputation or of dilution of 
the distinctive quality of a mark registered under this Act, 
or at a mark valid at common law, or a trade name valid at 
common law, shall be a ground for injunctive relief 
notwithstanding the absence of competition between the 
parties or the absence of confusion as to the source of 
goods or services.32 
Injunctive relief is typically the only remedy accompanying a 
finding of dilution.33  State dilution claims typically provide 
dilution relief in two instances: blurring and tarnishment. 
1. Blurring 
Dilution by blurring constitutes the traditional notion of 
dilution.  Blurring occurs as [c]ustomers or prospective 
customers . . . see the plaintiffs mark used by other persons to 
identify other sources on a plethora of different goods and 
services.34  While no confusion exists as to the source, 
sponsorship, affiliation or connection, the value of the plaintiffs 
mark decreases.35  The mark loses its unique and distinctive 
significance . . . to identify and distinguish one source . . . .36  The 
focus is upon damage to the inherent value of the mark as a symbol 
 
MISS. CODE ANN. § 75-25-25 (1996); MO. ANN. STAT. § 417.061(1) (West 1990); MONT. 
CODE ANN. § 30-13-334 (1993); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 350-A:12 (1995); N.J. STAT. 
ANN. § 56:3-13.20 (West 1998); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 57-3B-15 (Michie 2001); N.Y. GEN. 
BUS. LAW § 360-L (McKinney 1997); OR. REV. STAT. § 647.107 (1993); 54 PA. CONS. 
STAT. ANN. § 1124 (West 1996); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 6-2-12 (1992); S.C. CODE ANN. § 39-
15-1165 (Law. Co-op. 1996); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-25-512 (1995); TEX. BUS. & COM. 
CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 1995); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 19.77.160 (West 1997). 
31 See Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026 (2d 
Cir. 1989) (applying New York law); Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788 
(9th Cir. 1981) (applying California law). 
32 MODEL STATE TRADEMARK ACT § 12 (1964) [hereinafter MODEL ACT], reprinted in 3 
J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION § 22:8 
(4th ed. 2002); see Reichman, note 13, at 132. 
33 Reichman, supra note 13, at 132. 
34 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.68, at 24-120. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
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rather than upon whether the public has been misled with regard to 
origin or ownership.37 
In Hormel Foods Corp. v. Jim Henson Productions, Inc.,38 the 
Second Circuit considered whether the use of the character name 
Spaam in a movie blurred the Spam mark for luncheon 
meat.39  The court began by citing examples of dilution by 
blurring: DuPont shoes, Buick aspirin tablets, Schlitz varnish, 
Kodak pianos, Bulova gowns, and so forth.40  The court compared 
the use of the two marks and concluded that there was no 
likelihood the Henson parody would weaken the public association 
between Spam and lunch meat.41  Instead, the court posited that the 
parody would prevent the type of blurring which might result 
from a more subtle or insidious effort at humor at plaintiffs 
expense.42 
2. Tarnishment 
Dilution by tarnishment constitutes appreciable damage to the 
plaintiffs mark by anothers unflattering or offensive use.  The 
effect of the unauthorized use is to tarnish, degrade, or dilute the 
distinctive quality of the mark.43  Typical instances of tarnishment 
include an attempted parody context that is totally dissonant with 
the image protected by the mark.44  The effects of dilution by 
 
37 See Toho Co. v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 645 F.2d 788, 793 (9th Cir. 1981) (finding 
Sears use of Bagzilla has not impaired the effectiveness of the name and image of 
Godzilla). 
38 73 F.3d 497 (2d Cir. 1996). 
39 Id. at 500 (applying New Yorks anti-dilution statute). 
40 Id. at 506 (quoting the legislative history of New Yorks trademark law, 1954 N.Y. 
LEGIS. ANN. 4950). 
41 Id. 
42 Id.  The court continued: 
This conclusion is strengthened when we consider that Hensons parody 
undermines any superficial similarities the marks might share.  As we noted 
above, the name Spaam will always appear next to the character likeness 
and the words Muppet Treasure Island.  This dissimilarity alone could defeat 
Hormels blurring claim, for in order to establish dilution by blurring, the two 
marks must not only be similar, they must be very or substantially similar. 
Id. (quoting Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 F.2d 1026, 
1029 (2d Cir. 1989)). 
43 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, at § 24:69, at 24-121. 
44 Id. 
 2002] TRADEMARK DILUTION AND DOMAIN NAMES 241 
tarnishment are more readily apparent than the effects of dilution 
by blurring. 
In Hormel, the Second Circuit also considered whether the use 
of the character name Spaam tarnished the Spam mark.45  The 
court began this analysis by observing that tarnishment occurs 
when the public . . . associate[s] the lack of quality or lack of 
prestige in the defendants goods with the plaintiffs unrelated 
goods.46  The court reviewed precedent wherein successful 
tarnishment claims typically involved a tarnished mark placed in 
context of obscenity, sexual activity, or illegal activity.47  Hormel 
contended that the Spaam character, a grotesque, untidy wild 
boar, inspired unwelcome associations with Spam lunch meat.48  
The court again focused upon the humorous use of the Spaam 
character, finding no corresponding negative association with 
Hormels mark.49 
B. The FTDA 
In 1995, Congress passed the FTDA.50  Partly due to the 
patch-quilt system of trademark protection available through 
 
45 73 F.3d at 507. 
46 Id. (citing Deere & Co. v. MTD Products, Inc., 41 F.3d 39, 43 (2d Cir. 1994)). 
47 Id. 
48 Id. 
49 Id. 
50 Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, Pub. L. No. 104-98, § 3(a), 109 Stat. 985, 
98586 (1996) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000)): 
 (c) Remedies for dilution of famous marks 
(1) The owner of a famous mark shall be entitled, subject to the principles 
of equity and upon such terms as the court deems reasonable, to an 
injunction against another persons commercial use in commerce of a 
mark or trade name, if such use begins after the mark has become famous 
and causes dilution of the distinctive quality of the mark, and to obtain 
such other relief as is provided in this subsection.  In determining whether 
a mark is distinctive and famous, a court may consider factors such as, but 
not limited to 
(A) the degree of inherent or acquired distinctiveness of the mark; 
(B) the duration and extent of use of the mark in connection with the 
goods or services with which the mark is used; 
(C) the duration and extent of advertising and publicity of the mark; 
(D) the geographical extent of the trading area in which the mark is 
used; 
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state law, given that only about half of the fifty states provided a 
dilution cause of action,51 Congress sought to provide a federal 
cause of action to discourage forum shopping.52  The FTDA 
 
(E) the channels of trade for the goods or services with which the 
mark is used; 
(F) the degree of recognition of the mark in the trading areas and 
channels of trade used by the marks owner and the person against 
whom the injunction is sought; 
(G) the nature and extent of use of the same or similar marks by third 
parties; and 
(H) whether the mark was registered under the Act of March 3, 1881, 
or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal register. 
(2) In an action brought under this subsection, the owner of the famous 
mark shall be entitled only to injunctive relief as set forth in section 1116 
of this title unless the person against whom the injunction is sought 
willfully intended to trade on the owners reputation or to cause dilution of 
the famous mark.  If such willful intent is proven, the owner of the famous 
mark shall also be entitled to the remedies set forth in sections 1117(a) and 
1118 of this title, subject to the discretion of the court and the principles of 
equity. 
(3) The ownership by a person of a valid registration under the Act of 
March 3, 1881, or the Act of February 20, 1905, or on the principal 
register shall be a complete bar to an action against that person, with 
respect to that mark, that is brought by another person under the common 
law or a statute of a State and that seeks to prevent dilution of the 
distinctiveness of a mark, label, or form of advertisement. 
(4) The following shall not be actionable under this section: 
(A) Fair use of a famous mark by another person in comparative 
commercial advertising or promotion to identify the competing goods 
or services of the owner of the famous mark. 
(B) Noncommercial use of a mark. 
(C) All forms of news reporting and news commentary. 
15 U.S.C. § 1125. 
51 See Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. B.E. Windows Corp., 
937 F. Supp. 204, 208 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
52 Id. at 208; see also Kimbley L. Muller, Dilution Law: At A Crossroad? A Position of 
Advocacy in Support of Adoption of a Preemptive Federal Antidilution Statute, 83 
TRADEMARK REP. 175, 181, 188, 19192 (noting that state courts inconsistently interpret 
clear statutory language, states with greater populations and thereby more litigation 
control an important aspect of interstate commerce, and the injunctive relief afforded 
under state law is inadequate due to the geographic limitations). Cf. Richard L. 
Kirkpatrick & Sheldon H. Klein, A Commentary on the New Federal Trademark Dilution 
Law, in PROVING LIKELIHOOD OF CONFUSION IN TRADEMARK LAW: A COMMENTARY ON 
THE NEW FEDERAL TRADEMARK DILUTION LAW, at 60 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G4-3973, 1996) (As a 
practical matter, the trademark lawyer who likes to leave nothing unpleaded will now 
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contributed several new concepts to the realm of trademark 
dilution law.  First, the FTDA defines dilution as the lessening of 
the capacity of a famous mark to identify and distinguish goods or 
services, regardless of the presence or absence of(1) competition 
between the owner of the famous mark and other parties, or (2) 
likelihood of confusion, mistake, or deception.53  Second, the 
allegedly diluted mark must be famous and distinctive,54 among 
other factors.55 Additionally, unlike state dilution statutes which 
protect against a likelihood of dilution,56 the FTDA protects 
against a junior mark that causes dilution of the distinctive quality 
of the [senior] mark.57 
1. Fame 
For a mark to qualify for protection it must be famous.58  The 
FTDA does not define the term famous nor does it provide 
quantitative measures for determining fame.59  Rather, it sets forth 
eight factors,60 applicable in deciding both distinctiveness and 
fame.61  Courts and commentators have struggled in applying these 
 
simply tack a federal dilution claim onto the principal claims of infringement and false 
designation of origin, instead of (or in addition to) a state dilution claim.). 
53 15 U.S.C. § 1127. 
54 Id. § 1125(c)(1). 
55 The allegedly dilutive mark must not be on the principal register nor be validly 
registered. Id. § 1125(c)(3).  In addition, the alleged dilutive partys use began after the 
allegedly diluted mark became famous. Id. § 1125(c)(1).  The junior use of the allegedly 
dilutive mark is not considered a fair use, news reporting or news commentary. Id. § 
1125(c)(4)(A). See generally Gregg Duffey, Trademark Dilution Under the Federal 
Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Youve Come a Long Way BabyToo Far, Maybe?, 39 
S. TEX. L. REV. 133 (1997). 
 In addition, the dilutive use must be one that is a commercial use in commerce. See 
Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis. v. Network Solutions, Inc., 989 F. Supp. 1276, 
1278 (C.D. Cal. 1997).  For the purposes of this Article, it shall be assumed that such 
provisions outlined in this note are not at issue.  The mere registration of a domain name 
without more is not commercial use. Id.; but see infra Part IV.A. 
56 MODEL ACT, supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
57 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (emphasis added). 
58 Id. 
59 Xuan-Thao N. Nguyen, The New Wild West: Measuring and Proving Fame and 
Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 63 ALB. L. REV. 201, 20913 
(1999). 
60 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1)(A)(H). 
61 Nguyen, supra note 59, at 212. 
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factors and distinguishing fame from distinctiveness.62  While 
courts tend to consider fame63 and distinctiveness as separate 
elements, the analyses seem to be quite similar. 
In WAWA Dairy Farms v. Haaf, the U.S. District Court for the 
Eastern District of Pennsylvania considered whether the mark 
Wawa used for convenience stores was a famous mark.64  The 
court considered that the mark had been used extensively for 
nearly ninety years in the convenience store market.65  The mark, 
the court continued, achieved notoriety in the operation of the 
twenty-four hour convenience market by providing quality 
products, convenient locations and extensive advertising.66  The 
court concluded the Wawa mark therefore was famous under the 
FTDA.67 
In Michael Caruso & Co. v. Estefan Enterprises, Inc.,68 the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of Florida considered 
whether the Bongo mark used on jeans was famous.69  The court 
stated that a mark may be distinctive in a particular market, but to 
be considered famous it must effectuate the general recognition of 
 
62 See Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 87579 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(maintaining a stringent review of the eight non-exclusive statutory considerations for 
fame); Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 2000 WL 1428665, at *11*12 
(S.D. Ind. Aug. 30, 2000) (recognizing current dispute among courts as to whether fame 
is a separate inquiry from whether a mark is distinctive, holding secondary meaning will 
suffice in either respect); Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, What Constitutes Famous 
Mark for Purposes of Federal Trademark Dilution Act, 15 U.S.C.A. § 1125(c), Which 
Provides Remedies for Dilution of Famous Marks, 165 A.L.R. FED. 625 (2000) 
(cataloguing discussion of fame requirements for marks based upon recent decisions). 
63 Notable findings of fame include: Papal Visit 1999 for the papal visit to St. Louis; 
Dennison as part of a corporate name; Nailtiques as used in fingernail care products; 
TeleTech for customer care information services; Gazette for use in a local Maryland 
paper; Intermatic for electrical products; and Wedgwood for house builders in 
Oregon. Lemley, supra note 3, at 1698 n.50.  Nonetheless, in many cases, courts did not 
make an explicit finding that the mark in question was famous, or made such a finding 
only by confusing fame with distinctiveness. Id. at 1699 n.51 (citing Lori Krafte-Jacobs, 
Comment, Judicial Interpretation of the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995, 66 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 659, 690 (1998) (citation omitted)). 
64 40 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1629 (E.D. Pa. 1996), affd, 116 F.3d 471 (3d Cir. 1997). 
65 Id. at 162930. 
66 Id. 
67 Id. at 1630. 
68 994 F. Supp. 1454 (S.D. Fla. 1998). 
69 Id. at 1454. 
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the public in that market.70  Thus, while Bongo may have been 
distinctive in womens apparel, it was not inherently distinctive 
like Exxon or Kodak.71  In addition, the mere use of the 
Bongo mark for 15 years accompanied by extensive third-party 
uses of the term bongo weighed against a finding of fame.72 
2. Distinctiveness 
The FTDA mandates that the allegedly diluted mark be 
distinctive.73  While fame is a new addition to the realm of 
trademark law, distinctiveness is a familiar concept.  A trademark 
is generally protected in accordance with its distinctiveness.74  To 
even achieve a modicum of protection under the law, a merely 
descriptive trademark must acquire secondary meaning.75  The 
inclusion of a distinctiveness requirement in the FTDA has thereby 
puzzled courts and commentators.76 
Some commentators, such as Professor McCarthy, suggest that 
distinctiveness is simply a synonym for fame and that no separate 
finding of distinctiveness is necessary under the FTDA.77  On the 
other hand, in Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., the Second Circuit 
articulated that the inclusion of the term distinctiveness in the 
FTDA was meant to exclude non-distinctive marks from protection 
thereunder.78  Although this dispute exists under the FTDA, this 
 
70 Id. at 1463; see also Syndicate Sales, Inc. v. Hampshire Paper Corp., 192 F.3d 633, 
64041 (7th Cir. 1999) (holding that fame may be restricted to a narrow market if it is the 
same market in which the defendant operates). 
71 Michael Caruso, 994 F. Supp. at 1463. 
72 Id. 
73 See 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000). 
74 See RESTATEMENT, supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
75 See Abercrombie & Fitch Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 9 (2d Cir. 1976); 
RESTATEMENT, supra note 4. 
76 See, e.g., Nguyen, supra note 59, at 20913. 
77 4 MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24:91.1, at 24-15758 (A trademark cannot be 
famous unless it is distinctive, but it can be distinctive without being famous.  In 
fact, a designation cannot be a trademark at all unless it is distinctive.  By definition, all 
trademarks are distinctivevery few are famous.). 
78 Nabisco II, 191 F.3d 208, 216 n.2 (2d Cir. 1999) (We think the inclusion of the 
requirement of distinctiveness was intended, for good reason, to deny the protection of 
the statute to non-distinctive marks.).  Of course, as Professor McCarthy recognized, this 
is unnecessary because distinctiveness is a requirement to first qualify as a trademark. 4 
MCCARTHY, supra note 26, § 24.91.1, at 24-156 ([B]asic trademark principles dictate 
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Article will focus on another quarrel over the statutory 
interpretation of the FTDA.  After satisfying the fame and 
distinctiveness quandaries, the plaintiff must then demonstrate that 
the defendants mark causes dilution.79 
II. CAUSES DILUTION SPLIT 
The defendants use must cause dilution of the distinctive 
quality of the plaintiffs mark.  Notwithstanding the statutory 
language, from the enactment of the FTDA until 1999, courts 
proceeded with federal dilution claims in the same manner as state 
or common law dilution claims.  Recently, the U.S. Supreme Court 
granted certiorari to resolve this circuit split.80 
A. Pre-Split Standard 
Courts initially considered the new FTDA as providing merely 
a higher standard of fame or distinctiveness.  Rather than viewing 
the causation element as determining whether the defendants mark 
causes dilution of the famous mark, courts instead considered 
whether there was a likelihood of dilution of the famous mark. 
In Clinique Laboratories, Inc. v. Dep Corp.,81 the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York examined the 
causation standard under the FTDA.82  Judge Scheindlin began by 
asserting the plaintiff has a lighter burden under the new FTDA 
than under prior federal trademark infringement analysis.83  Citing 
the legislative history rather than the text of the statute itself, the 
court observed that the language mirrors the traditional New York 
dilution analysis, under which dilution can be established by a 
showing of either blurring or tarnishment.84  Judge Scheindlin 
 
that a designation has to be distinctive either inherently or through acquisition of 
secondary meaning.). 
79 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(1) (2000). 
80 See V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 
122 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015). 
81 945 F. Supp. 547 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). 
82 Id. at 561. 
83 Id. 
84 Id. (referring to H.R. REP. NO. 374, at 3 (1995), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
1029, 1030). 
 2002] TRADEMARK DILUTION AND DOMAIN NAMES 247 
considered the five-factor Mead Data test to assess the dilution by 
blurring claim: 1) similarity of the trademarks; 2) similarity of the 
products; 3) sophistication of the customers; 4) renown of the 
senior mark; and 5) renown of the junior mark.85 
B. Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.86 
For nearly three years, district courts followed the standard set 
forth in Clinique for claims under the FTDA.87  In 1999, the 
Second and Fourth Circuits considered the applicability of the 
FTDA for the first time.  In Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc.,88 the 
Second Circuit upheld an injunction preventing the distribution of 
Nabiscos cheese crackers into the marketplace due to the 
likelihood of diluting the goldfish cheese cracker trademark of 
Pepperidge Farm.89  In this manner, the court interpreted the FTDA 
to permit adjudication granting or denying an injunction, whether 
at the instance of the senior user or the junior seeking declaratory 
relief, before the [alleged] dilution has actually occurred.90 
 
85 Id. at 562 (citing Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A., Inc., 875 
F.2d 1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989)); see also supra Part I.A. 
86 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). Certain factual findings are contained in the district court 
opinion, see Nabisco, Inc. v. PF Brands, Inc., 50 F. Supp. 2d 188 (S.D.N.Y. 1999) 
[hereinafter Nabisco I]. 
87 See, e.g., Liquid Glass Enters., Inc. v. Dr. Ing, 8 F. Supp. 2d 398, 404 (D.N.J. 1998) 
(indicating that plaintiff need only show that the defendants use of his trademarks is 
likely to cause dilution); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Asiafocus Intl, Inc., 1998 WL 724000, 
at *7 (E.D. Va. Apr. 10, 1998) (stating the FTDA protects a famous mark from a 
likelihood of dilution); Johnson Publg Co. v. Willitts Designs Intl, Inc., 1998 WL 
341618, at *7 (N.D. Ill. June 22, 1998) (providing plaintiff must establish that 
defendants use of defendants mark creates a likelihood of dilution); Minn. Mining & 
Mfg. Co. v. Taylor, 21 F. Supp. 2d 1003, 1005 (D. Minn. 1998) (finding defendants use 
of his marks were likely to dilute plaintiffs famous mark); Fed. Express Corp. v. Fed. 
Espresso, Inc., 1998 WL 690903, at *20 (N.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 1998) (utilizing the Mead 
Data five-factor test to determine whether dilution by blurring occurred under the 
FTDA). 
88 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999). 
89 Id. at 22829. 
90 Id. at 22425. Contra Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999) (holding that a plaintiff must 
show that a sufficiently similar junior mark must actually lessen the ability of the senior 
mark to distinguish its goods). 
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Scholars contend that outlandish, specific factual scenarios 
generate generally applicable precedent;91 it would, therefore, be 
useful to examine the facts of the cheese cracker dispute.  
Nabisco,92 in an agreement with Nickelodeon,93 sought to produce 
a snack food product based upon the CatDog94 television show.  
The ensuing product consisted of miniature orange-colored, 
cheese-flavored crackers in the shapes of the two-headed CatDog 
character, as well as bones and fish.95  The CatDog-shaped-cracker 
represented half of the crackers in a given package, the bone and 
the fish each represented one quarter.96  The packaging featured 
the CatDog character with bones and fish in the background.97 
Pepperidge Farm98 began producing its Goldfish99 line of 
crackers in 1962.100  Since its inception, the Goldfish product has 
 
91 See, e.g., Lemley, supra note 3, at 1697 (noting that, particularly in trademark law, 
courts seem to be making . . . law for the extreme case, but . . . then apply[ing] that law 
to a large number of run-of-the-mill trademarks). 
92 For the purposes of this Article, the term Nabisco includes both (i) Nabisco, Inc., a 
New Jersey corporation; and (ii) Nabisco Brands Co., a Delaware corporation. See 
Nabisco, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 194.  Nabisco products include cookie and cracker foods, 
including Cheese Nips, the third-best selling brand in the cheese-cracker market. Id. 
93 Nickelodeon Television Network, a subsidiary of Viacom International, Inc., airs 
television programs aimed at children. Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 213. 
94 CatDog is a cartoon program on the Nickelodeon network. The star of the program 
is CatDog, a two-headed creature that is half cat and half dog. Id.  Apparently, CatDog 
has a split personality: the cat is fastidious and emotionally reserved, while the dog is 
slovenly and boisterous.  Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d 188, 19596 (S.D.N.Y. 1999).  
CatDog garnered a 3.9 Nielsen rating in its first quarter on the air, making it one of the 
most-watched childrens programs. Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 213. 
95 Nabisco contended the images of bones and fish represented the duality of the 
CatDog character. Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 196.  CatDog lived in a house in the shape 
of a bone and a goldfish, the characters respective eating preferences. Nabisco I, 50 F. 
Supp. 2d at 196.  While the shapes appear in CatDogs house on the wallpaper and 
furniture in Nickelodeons marketing video and on the Internet, the district court noted: 
Although the CatDog house is built in the shape of a fish and a bone, it appears 
on the screen only a few times, for a few seconds.  The fish on the wallpaper 
and furniture are almost indiscernible.  If one were to sneeze while watching 
that portion of the video, one would miss the fish shape entirely. 
Id. (commenting on the marketing video).  CatDog images are available at 
http://www.nick.com/all_nick/tv_supersites/display_show.jhtml?show_id=cat. Id. 
96 Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 213. 
97 Id. 
98 For the purposes of this Article, the term Pepperidge Farm includes both (i) 
Pepperidge Farm, Inc., a Connecticut corporation; and (ii) PF Brands, Inc., a Delaware 
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become quite successful.  In 1998, net sales of Goldfish crackers 
reached $200 million.101  The success of recent marketing efforts 
has attracted attention from the popular media102 and trade press.103  
Pepperidge Farm also owns numerous registered trademarks 
related to Goldfish.104  Upon learning of Nabiscos proposals 
related to the launch of the CatDog product, Pepperidge Farm took 
appropriate action to protect its Goldfish brand. 
U.S. District Court Judge Scheindlin once again utilized the 
Mead Data five-factor test to determine whether there was a 
likelihood of dilution.105  The judge held that Nabiscos mark had a 
likelihood of diluting Pepperidge Farms goldfish mark.106  The 
court focused on the distinctiveness of the Pepperidge Farm 
goldfish mark, finding Nabiscos confusingly similar fish-shaped 
cheese cracker to be a signature element of its product that 
strikes at the heart of what dilution should prevent:107 Over 
 
corporation. See Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 194.  Pepperidge Farm products include 
crackers, snack mixes, pastries, cookies, and other baked goods. Id. 
99 For the purposes of this Article, the term Goldfish shall refer to the Pepperidge 
Farm line of products, including crackers in various flavors and mixes, the primary 
product . . . [being] . . . the orange, cheddar cheese-flavored, fish-shaped cracker, sold in 
a bag or box under the trade name Goldfish and exhibiting a picture of the cracker on 
the exterior. Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 212.  In terms of sales volume, Goldfish is the 
number one selling cheese snack cracker in the United States. Id. at 213. 
100 Id. at 212. 
101 Id. at 213.  The net sales more than doubled in the period from 1995 to 1998. Id. 
102 Id.  Both the Today Show and the sitcom Friends have prominently featured Goldfish 
crackers. Id. 
103 The New York Times devoted a full page to the success of the Goldfish brand. 
Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 194 n.7 (citing Constance Hays, Will Goldfish Tactics Help 
Campbells Soups?, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 18, 1998, at A3). 
104 Nabisco I, 50 F. Supp. 2d at 192 n.1.  Pepperidge Farm owns trademark registrations 
on (i) the name Goldfish for bakery products, U.S. Reg. No. 739,118; (ii) the product 
design of the cracker, U.S. Reg. No. 1,640,659; (iii) the product design of a container for 
crackers in the shape of a Goldfish, U.S. Reg. No. 1,804,657; (iv) the product design of a 
smiling Goldfish for cookies U.S. Reg. No. 1,845,811; (v) the name Goldfish for snack 
mix U.S. Reg. No. 1,869,834; (vi) the product design of a Goldfish with a smile for 
crackers and snack mix U.S. Reg. No. 2,054,823; (vii) and the product design of a 
smiling Goldfish with sunglasses for crackers U.S. Reg. No. 2,176,927. Nabisco I, 50 F. 
Supp. 2d at 192 n.1.  Such registrations become incontestable after five years of use and 
compliance with Lanham Act formalities. Id. at 192 n.2. 
105 Id. at 20509; see also RESTATEMENT, supra note 4. 
106 Id. at 210. 
107 Id. at 209. 
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time, the presence of Nabiscos goldfish-shaped cracker within the 
CatDog mix is likely to weaken the focus of consumers on the true 
source of the Goldfish.108 
While upholding the District Courts ultimate finding of 
dilution, the Second Circuit disagreed with the application of the 
Mead Data test to the new federal cause of action set forth in the 
FTDA.109  The court, citing several deficiencies with the Mead 
Data test,110 commented, it is by far premature for federal courts 
to declare and close the list of factors that will be deemed pertinent 
in cases under the new federal act.111  The Second Circuit also 
considered the language of the FTDA in fashioning precisely what 
showing was necessary to demonstrate causation.112  The court 
acknowledged that the FTDA required causation in the present 
tense (causes dilution) as opposed to the state law dilution 
standard of likelihood of dilution.113  Nonetheless, if one reads 
the statute to require consummated dilution, one is engaging in 
excessive literalism to defeat the intent of the statute.114  The 
court rejected any contention that the complaining party would 
have to demonstrate diminished revenues or produce consumer 
surveys to establish dilution.115  Rather, contextual factors, such as 
 
108 Id. at 210. 
109 Nabisco II, 191 F.3d 208, 22729 (2d Cir. 2001). 
110 The test (i) confuses fame and distinctiveness, and (ii) fails to include pertinent 
factors such as actual confusion, likelihood of confusion, shared consumers and 
geographic isolation, the adjectival quality of the junior use, and the interrelated factors 
of duration of the junior use, harm to the junior user, and delay by the senior [sic] in 
bringing the action. Id. at 228; cf. Polaroid Corp. v. Polarad Elects. Corp., 287 F.2d 492, 
495 (2d Cir. 1961) (presenting the oft-cited Polaroid test for trademark infringement: (i) 
strength of the senior mark; (ii) similarity of the marks in question; (iii) product 
proximity; (iv) quality proximity; (v) likelihood that senior user will bridge the gap and 
enter the junior users market; (vi) actual confusion; (vii) good faith of the junior user; 
(viii) sophistication of the buyers).  The Polaroid test is also known as the Sleekcraft or 
Frisch test.  The factors suggested by the Second Circuit in Nabisco II seem to provide a 
senior user with a trademark infringement action with a lower standard of proof. Nabisco 
II, 191 F.3d at 228 (applying the FTDA to competitors). 
111 Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 227. 
112 Id. at 224. 
113 See id. 
114 Id. 
115 See id. at 22324. 
 2002] TRADEMARK DILUTION AND DOMAIN NAMES 251 
those used to prove trademark infringement, are sufficient to 
establish dilution before any harm actually occurs to the mark.116 
By rejecting the Mead Data test used by the district court and 
applying the factors . . . we believe to be pertinent,117 the Second 
Circuit left the FTDA in a state of confusion.  The court provided 
no framework, but instead rejected a standard used previously in a 
body of precedent and interpreted the FTDA in a manner that 
frustrated  the statutory language. 
C. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Division of Travel Development118 
In Ringling Bros., the Fourth Circuit affirmed the judgment of 
the district court denying Ringling Brothers FTDA claim based 
upon Utah Divisions use of the mark, The Greatest Snow on 
Earth.119  In so doing, the court interpreted the FTDA to provide a 
remedy only for actual, consummated dilution and not for the 
mere likelihood of dilution proscribed by the state statutes.120  
The Fourth Circuit also applied the definition of dilution in the 
FTDA, finding that the harm the FTDA intends to remedy is a 
marks selling power, not its distinctiveness.121  This reading of the 
FTDA is diametrically opposed to the Second Circuits opinion in 
Nabisco.122 
Ringling Brothers employed The Greatest Show on Earth 
mark for over one hundred years, enjoying great success.123  In 
1962, the Utah Division of Travel began using The Greatest Snow 
on Earth to advertise its skiing facilities.124  Ringling Brothers 
 
116 Id. at 224; see also Reichman, supra note 13. 
117 Nabisco II, 191 F.3d at 228. 
118 170 F.3d 449 (4th Cir. 1999). 
119 Id. at 451. 
120 Id. at 458. 
121 See 25 U.S.C. § 1125(c) (2000); Ringling Bros., 170 F.3d at 458. 
122 191 F.3d 208 (2d Cir. 1999); see supra Part I.B. 
123 Ringling Brothers owns full and valid federal registration of its service mark The 
Greatest Show on Earth.  Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. 
Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 955 F. Supp. 605, 609 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 170 F.3d 449 
(4th Cir. 1999).  Registration issued on December 5, 1961. Id.  In 1996, Ringling 
produced over 6.5 billion reproductions of their mark. Id. at 610.  In 1997 alone, 
concession merchandise featuring the mark exceeded $100 million in sales. Id. at 609. 
124 Id. at 611. 
 252 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:231 
challenged the federal registration of the Utah mark.125  Ringling 
Brothers commissioned a consumer survey to demonstrate the 
dilution of its mark.126  In relevant part, the survey showed that 
41% of the respondents in the U.S. associated The Greatest ___ 
on Earth with Ringling alone, while only 25% of the respondents 
within Utah so associated the statement.127 
U.S. District Court Judge Ellis began by observing that 
Ringling Brothers mark was famous and that the alleged dilutive 
use began after Ringling Brothers mark became famous.128  The 
judge then considered the causation element in determining how 
this phenomenon can be detected or measured.129  Judge Ellis 
applied the Mead Data test to determine dilution, reasoning that 
such application was not inconsistent with the FTDA.130  The court 
concluded that the survey evidence, accompanied by a balancing of 
the Mead Data factors, did not demonstrate dilution.131 
 
125 See id. at 613. 
126 Id. at 612.  RL Associates conducted the survey by interviewing consumers at seven 
shopping malls throughout the U.S.  Randomly selected shoppers received a card with a 
series of fill-in-the-blank statements.  The first statement was I Love ___.  The second 
was Dont Leave ____ Without It.  The final statement was The Greatest ___ on 
Earth.  If the shopper could correctly identify the final statement, RL Associates 
inquired as to with whom or what the shopper associated the completed statement.  RL 
Associates then inquired further as to whether the shopper associated the statement with 
any other source. Id. 
127 Id. at 616. 
128 See id. at 613. 
129 Id. 
130 See id. at 61314. 
131 See id. at 61622.  The court found that the survey evidence did not indicate dilution 
in Utah.  Survey respondents who filled in the blank with Show did not associate the 
statement with the Utah Division of Travel.  Furthermore, 46% of the respondents in 
Utah, compared to 41% elsewhere in the country, associated The Greatest Show on 
Earth with Ringling Brothers.  This is strong evidence of the absence of dilution, not 
the presence of it. Id. at 617. 
 The court then turned to the [c]ircumstantial [e]vidence of [d]ilution as applied 
under the Mead Data test. Id. at 618.  The court adduced that (i) the marks were not 
relevantly similar; (ii) the products were entirely dissimilar; (iii) the corresponding lack 
of sophistication of the Ringling Brothers consumers with the sophistication of the Utah 
Division of Travel consumers was a neutral factor; (iv) there was no predatory intent; (v) 
Ringling Brothers mark was famous and thereby well-known; and (vi) Utah Division of 
Travels mark is not very well-known. Id. at 61822.  The resolution of these factors 
thereby weighed in favor of Ringling Brothers. Id. at 622. 
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While upholding the district courts decision, the Fourth 
Circuit refused to apply the Mead Data test.132  The court believed 
the extension of the test to the FTDA was a chancy process at 
best.133  Factors such as consumer sophistication and predatory 
intent may be useful in proving a likelihood of dilution, but 
provided little utility in determining actual harm and effective 
causation.134  Dissatisfied with the Mead Data test, the court 
turned to the language of the FTDA to determine dilution 
causation.135 
Recognizing the experience of the likelihood of dilution 
analysis under state and common law dilution, the court considered 
the causation provision of the FTDA.136  The court viewed the 
language defining dilution in conjunction with the commercial use 
provisions in an economic sense: 
However amorphously they may be expressed, and 
however difficult to prove in practice, the [FTDA] literally 
prescribes as elements of its dilution claim both specific 
harm to the senior marks economic value in the form of a 
lessening of [its] capacity . . . to identify and distinguish 
goods and services, and a causal connection between that 
harm and the commercial use of a replicating junior 
mark.137 
Any other application of the FTDA would produce a property 
right in gross for famous marks, comparable to a copyright or 
patent but without a specific time limit.138  The Fourth Circuit 
insisted that Congress did not intend to create unlimited property 
rights in famous trademarks through the use of injunctions for a 
mere likelihood of dilution.139 
 
132 Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel 
Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 451, 453 (4th Cir. 1999). 
133 See id. at 464. 
134 See id. 
135 See id. at 45862. 
136 See id. 
137 Id. at 459 (citing 15 U.S.C. §§ 1125(c)(1), 1127 (1995)). 
138 See id. at 456. 
139 See id. at 459 (Had that been the intention, it is one easily and simply expressed by 
merely proscribing use of any substantially replicating junior mark.); id. at 461 n.6 (If 
the words convey a definite meaning, which involves no absurdity, nor any contradiction 
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The court acknowledged the difficulty of proving dilution 
under its interpretation of the FTDA;140 this difficulty may have 
led to earlier courts simply applying the likelihood of dilution 
analysis rather than facing up to th[is] interpretive difficulty.141  
Despite these problems of proof, the Fourth Circuit refused to 
allow courts to ignore the FTDAs causes dilution requirement, 
holding that actual, consummated dilutive harm was 
necessary.142  The court outlined potential evidentiary sources, 
including (i) actual lost revenues accompanied by replicating 
junior use to disprove other possible causes; (ii) surveys from 
which actual harm and cause may be rationally inferred;143 and (iii) 
other relevant contextual factors.144 
In analyzing whether such proof was present in this case, the 
Fourth Circuit upheld the findings of Judge Ellis.145  The court 
reiterated that the survey evidence failed to show any actual harm 
to the Ringling Brothers mark.146  The use of the junior mark did 
not lessen the ability of the Ringling Brothers mark to identify and 
distinguish its service.147  Focusing entirely upon evidence of 
consumers mental impressions, Ringling Brothers needed to show 
actual harm to the selling or advertising power of its mark.148  
Mere mental impressions without accompanying economic harm 
failed to satisfy this threshold.149  Remaining true to the language 
of the FTDA while enunciating a potential framework for 
 
of other parts of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent on the face of the instrument, 
must be accepted . . . .  (quoting Lake County v. Rollins, 130 U.S. 662, 670 (1889))). 
140 See id. at 464. 
141 Id. (Courts must of course presume in interpreting statutes creating new civil causes 
of action that they have enforceable substantive content.  So, within permissible 
interpretative bounds, they must seek to find such a meaning rather than ascribe to 
Congress the intended or inadvertent doing of a vain legislative deed.). 
142 See id. at 46465. 
143 Id. at 465 (An effective survey . . . must establish not only that consumers associate 
the mark with both parties, but also that some quanta of the original marks identifying 
ability or selling power has been diminished. (citing Patrick M. Bible, Defining and 
Quantifying Dilution Under the Federal Trademark Dilution Act of 1995: Using Survey 
Evidence to Show Actual Dilution, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 295, 32728 (1999))). 
144 Id. 
145 See id. at 46364. 
146 See id. at 463. 
147 Id. 
148 Id. 
149 See id. 
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analyzing future cases, the Fourth Circuit prudently interpreted the 
new federal statute. 
D. Policy Considerations 
Subsequent writings on FTDA causation tend to be polarized.  
Courts and commentators unabashedly support one circuit over 
another, raising various new questions and concerns.  Several 
courts considering the issue followed the Fourth Circuits strict 
adherence to the FTDAs language.  In Westchester Media v. PRL 
USA Holdings, Inc.,150 the Fifth Circuit followed the rationale of 
the Ringling Bros. court.151  The court emphasized the present 
tense of the verb causes in the FTDA,152 the lack of modification 
of the term dilution,153 the use of the phrase another 
persons . . . use (not merely threatened use)154 and the provision 
of damages for willful conduct to strongly indicate that actual, 
consummated dilution,  rather than mere likelihood of dilution, 
is required.155  Other district courts deciding to follow the Fourth 
Circuit also echoed these observations.156 
 
150 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cir. 2000). 
151 Id. at 670.  For an interesting discussion about the implications of the dilution 
dilemma to trade dress, see I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co., 163 F.3d 27, 4751 
(1st Cir. 1998). 
152 Westchester, 214 F.3d at 67071. 
153 Id. at 671.  The court referenced language from state statutes modifying the term 
dilution. Id. at 670 n.16 (citing TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 16.29 (Vernon 2002) 
(A person may . . . enjoin an act likely to . . . dilute the distinctive quality of a 
mark . . . .) (emphasis added); N.Y. GEN. BUS. LAW § 360-1 (McKinney 2002) 
(Likelihood of . . . dilution of the distinctive quality of a mark . . . shall be a ground for 
injunctive relief . . . .) (emphasis added). 
154 Id. at 66970 (highlighting one of the most critical differences between the FTDA 
and state statutes the provisions of the state statutes focus upon the prevention of future 
harm whereas the FTDA contemplates actual harm). 
155 See id. 
156 See, e.g., Deborah Heart & Lung Ctr. v. Children of the World Found., 99 F. Supp. 
2d 481, 49293 (D.N.J. 2000) (following the Fourth Circuits actual harm standard); Am. 
Cyanamid Co. v. Nutraceutical Corp., 54 F. Supp. 2d 379, 39192 (D.N.J. 1999) 
(adopting the Ringling standard); Playboy Enters., Inc. v. Netscape Comm., Corp., 55 F. 
Supp. 2d 1070, 1075  (C.D. Cal. 1999) (applying the Ringling standard and stating 
dilution is not intended to serve as a mere fallback protection for trademark owners 
unable to prove trademark infringement (quoting I.P. Lund Trading ApS, 163 F.3d at 
48)); HQM, Ltd. v. Hatfield, 71 F. Supp. 2d 500, 509 (D. Md. 1999) (obligating a 
showing of actual harm); Planet Hollywood (Region IV), Inc. v. Hollywood Casino 
 256 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:231 
Some courts considering the issue viewed the Ringling Bros. 
standard as too stringent, its high standard of proof allegedly 
preventing recovery in many circumstances.  In Times Mirror 
Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas Sports News, L.L.C., the Third 
Circuit adopted the improved Mead Data test articulated by the 
Second Circuit in Nabisco.157  Without expressly addressing the 
split, the majority upheld the application of the Nabisco 
approach.158  Judge Barry, in a dissenting opinion,159 nonetheless 
agreed with such application: 
I agree [in siding with the Second Circuit and rejecting the 
Fourth Circuits position on the issue], and note only that it 
would be well-nigh impossible for a widely sold product 
such as Kodak to show that its sales have been impacted by 
a diluting use of its mark.  Indeed, Kodaks sales might 
well be increasing even as the distinctiveness of its truly 
famous mark is being whittled away by an unauthorized 
user.160 
 
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 2d 815, 899 (N.D. Ill. 1999) (requiring showing of economic harm to 
prove dilution). 
 Due to the opinion of the Third Circuit in Times Mirror Magazines, Inc. v. Las Vegas 
Sports News, L.L.C., 212 F.3d 157 (3d Cir. 2000), the opinions of the U.S. District Court 
for the District of New Jersey in both American Cyanamid and Deborah Heart are 
presumably overruled. Id. at 179 n.11, (Barry, J., dissenting) (The majority also holds 
that the District Court did not err in finding that irreparable injury may be shown even in 
the absence of actual economic harm, presumably siding with the Second Circuit and 
rejecting the Fourth Circuits position on the issue.).  The Third Circuit filed the Times 
Mirror decision on April 28, 2000. Id. at 157.  The U.S. District Court for the District of 
New Jersey decided the Deborah Heart case on May 24, 2000. 99 F. Supp. 2d at 481.  
Presumably, therefore, Deborah Heart was not good law when it was issued. 
157 Times Mirror Magazines, 212 F.3d at 169. 
158 Id. 
159 The purpose of Judge Barrys dissent is not germane to this Article.  Judge Barry 
disagreed with the majority in its application of the fame framework under the FTDA. Id. 
at 170 (Barry, J., dissenting). 
160 Id. at 179 n.11 (Barry, J., dissenting); cf. Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Bailey Combined 
Shows, Inc. v. Utah Div. of Travel Dev., 170 F.3d 449, 460 (4th Cir. 1999), providing: 
It is not at all improbable that some junior uses will have no effect at all upon a 
senior marks economic value, whether for lack of exposure, general consumer 
disinterest in both marks products, or other reasons.  Indeed, common sense 
suggests that an occasional replicating use might even enhance a senior marks 
magnetismby drawing renewed attention to it as a mark of unshakable 
eminence worthy of emulation by an unthreatening non-competitor.  Imitation, 
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This view espoused by the dissenting judge (and implicitly by the 
Third Circuit) protects the trademark itself, rather than its selling 
power or the ability of consumers to identify the famous mark.161 
In Eli Lilly & Co. v. Natural Answers, Inc.,162 the Seventh 
Circuit followed the improved Mead Data test, finding that the 
Fourth Circuits rule required an insurmountable level of proof163 
and left senior mark holders without a remedy.164  Because it 
would be necessary to prove actual harm under the Fourth Circuits 
interpretation, senior mark holders would not be able to bring a 
lawsuit prior to an injury.165  At the time the senior mark holders 
sustain an injury compensable under the FTDA, a junior mark 
holder may have a defense that the senior mark is no longer 
distinctive due to the many other uses of the mark.166  Furthermore, 
new companies would be unable to determine if their mark was 
distinct enough from a famous mark and would require greater and 
riskier investments in their advertising.167  The Seventh Circuit 
 
that is, may occasionally operate in the marketplace as in social manners as the 
sincerest form of flattery. 
Id. 
161 See generally Mead Data Cent., Inc. v. Toyota Motor Sales, U.S.A. Inc., 875 F.2d 
1026, 1035 (2d Cir. 1989) (Sweet, J., concurring). 
162 233 F.3d 456 (7th Cir. 2000). 
163 Id. at 468 (It is hard to believe that Congress would create a right of action but at 
the same time render proof of the plaintiffs case all but impossible.). 
164 See id. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. at 46869. 
167 See id. at 468.  Of course, this ignores the entire federal trademark registration 
scheme. See generally Silverman v. CBS, Inc., 870 F.2d 40, 4649 (2d Cir. 1989) 
(reviewing the registration process).  A company so worried would be able to apply for a 
federal registration of its proposed mark and the examiner would bring up concerns over 
conflicting marks. Id.  It also neglects the availability of state remedies under the 
likelihood of dilution standard. See supra Part I.A. 
 In 1999, Congress authorized the Patent and Trademark Office [PTO] to consider the 
FTDA when considering the registration of a trademark or the cancellation of a registered 
trademark. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1052(f), 1063, 1064 (2000); Brief for the United States as 
Amicus Curiae at 2526, V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 
2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015) [hereinafter 
U.S. Brief], available at http://supreme.lp.findlaw.com/supreme_court/briefs/01-1015/01-
1015.mer.ami.usa.pdf (last visited Nov. 22, 2002).  An opposition may be filed with the 
PTO to a trademark registration application when such applicant believes that he would 
be damaged by the registration of a mark . . . as a result of dilution. Id. at 15 (citing § 
1063).  Such person may also petition the PTO to cancel the registration of a mark when 
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concluded, Congress could not have intended these unjust and 
inefficient results.168 
In V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley,169 the Sixth Circuit 
adopted the Nabisco likelihood of dilution standard, finding the 
Ringling Bros. actual economic harm standard contrary to 
congressional intent.170  The court acknowledged that the dilution 
cause of action essentially involves a property right in the 
potency of a mark.171  The Sixth Circuit also construed a 
statement in the congressional record to evince that the FTDA 
provides a remedy prior to any actual economic harm to the senior 
mark.172  A study of  the legislative history led the court to 
conclude that it [is] highly unlikely that Congress would have 
intended to create such a statute but then make its proof effectively 
unavailable.173  The U.S. Supreme Court granted Moseleys 
 
she believes that [s]he is or will be damaged, including as a result of dilution. Id. 
(citing § 1064).  The PTO may also refuse the registration of [a] mark which when used 
would cause dilution, and the PTO may cancel [a] registration for a mark which when 
used would cause dilution. Id. (citing § 1052(f). 
 Therefore, while amending the law to permit the PTO to consider future dilution and 
making no changes in the causes dilution standard, Congress intended to channel 
claims of prospective dilution to [the] PTO, and to limit judicial relief to causes where 
some dilution had already occurred. Id. at 1516. 
168 Eli Lilly, 233 F.3d at 468 (In the case of an immensely successful product such as 
PROZAC, it is possible that the distinctiveness of its mark could be diluted even as its 
sales are increasing, albeit not increasing as much as they would in the absence of the 
offending mark.). 
169 V Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 
S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015). 
170 Id. at 47576 
171 Id. at 475. 
172 See id. at 47576.  The statement provided that dilution is 
an injury that differs materially from that arising out of the orthodox confusion.  
Even in the absence of confusion, the potency of a mark may be debilitated by 
anothers use.  That is the essence of dilution.  Confusion leads to immediate 
injury, while dilution is an infection, which if allowed to spread, will inevitably 
destroy the advertising value of the mark. 
Id. at 475 (citing H.R. REP. No. 104-374 (1995), reprinted in 1995 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1029, 
1032). 
173 Id. at 476.  It appears remarkable that Congress would adopt statutory language 
contrary to the state-law likelihood of dilution standard all the while intending to 
replicate it. MODEL ACT, supra note 32. 
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petition for certiorari to determine whether the FTDA requires 
actual consummated harm.174 
In its amicus curiae brief, the United States advocated a novel 
solution to the circuit split. The Solicitor General contended that 
the FTDA does not require actual economic harm nor a likelihood 
of dilution, but, simply, present dilution.175  The American Bar 
Association argued that using Buick for aspirin would diminish 
the capacity176 of such a famous mark to distinguish its goods, but 
inferring economic harm from this act alone would be 
problematic.177  Evidence of economic harm, if available, would be 
highly probative but should not be a requirement.178  This 
intriguing proposition seems to lay between the speculative 
likelihood of dilution Nabisco standard and the consummated 
actual economic harm Ringling Bros. standard. 
The approach adopted by the Second Circuit creates a two-
tiered protection framework for trademark holders.  Those marks 
that achieve fame can rely on the lax likelihood of dilution 
analysis for all potentially diluting or infringing marks.  Since this 
standard is much easier to evaluate than the infringement 
analysis,179 judges are more likely to decide a case on dilution than 
 
174 122 S. Ct. 1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015). 
175 U.S. Brief, supra note 167, at 2526.  The Solicitor General contrasted the state law 
dilution statutes that allow relief based upon a likelihood of dilution with the FTDAs 
language of causes dilution. Id. at 6.  If Congress intended the former, it could have 
used language such as the conditional tense would cause or the future tense will 
cause (or simply adopted the state law language). Id. 
176 Cf. Brief of the American Bar Association as Amicus Curiae at 45, 9, 1213, V 
Secret Catalogue, Inc. v. Moseley, 259 F.3d 464 (6th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 
1536 (U.S. Apr. 15, 2002) (No. 01-1015), available at http://www.abanet.org/intelprop/ 
amicubrief.pdf (last visited Aug. 15, 2002) (utilizing Websters dictionary to illuminate 
the term capacity contained within the statutory definition of dilution in 15 U.S.C. § 
1127 (2000) to eventually arrive at the contention that the FTDA textually supports the 
likelihood of dilution analysis).  The ABA further contended that the Solicitor General 
focuses unduly on the [statutory] phrase causes dilution and pays insufficient attention 
to the definition of dilution. Id. at 6 n.11 (citing U.S. Brief, supra note 167, at 2526 at 
67, 1314, 2627). 
177 U.S. Brief, supra note 167, at 25 ([T]he text of the FTDA only requires proof that a 
junior use causes a lessening in the capacity of the famous mark to distinguish goods and 
services.). 
178 Id. at 26. 
179 See Reichman, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
 260 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP., MEDIA & ENT. L.J. [Vol. 13:231 
face a more difficult infringement analysis.180  The non-famous 
marks, on the other hand, would have to rely upon the more 
difficult infringement analysis and state or common law dilution, if 
available. 
Commentators are split over the implications of the Nabisco 
courts broad reading.  Some commentators purposefully advocate 
a property right for the holders of famous trademarks.181  Other 
commentators view the property right as a dangerous expansion of 
trademark rights to the detriment of competition.182 
III. THE DOMAIN NAME SYSTEM 
While the application of the Nabisco standard alarms some 
commentators and courts when applied to run-of-the-mill 
trademarks, it is especially alarming when applied to domain 
names.  The special features of domain names preclude the 
potential for differentiation among other domain names, unlike that 
of trademarks affixed to goods that may differ in color, size, smell, 
placement on product, etc.  Today (if not by the mid-1990s), no 
major corporation can deny the importance of an Internet site.183  
Businesses with a brand name product typically seek to employ the 
website http://www.brandname.com.184  The unavailability of 
the brand name domain led many corporations to turn to trademark 
 
180 See U.S. Brief, supra note 167 at 25. 
181 See, e.g., Maya Alexandri, The International News Quasi-Property Paradigm and 
Trademark Incontestability: A Call for Rewriting the Lanham Act, 13 HARV. J.L. & 
TECH, 303, 34344 (2000) (acknowledging the movement in trademark law towards 
recognizing trademarks as property and outlining the argument for granting such rights). 
182 Marroletti, supra note 16, at 68890 (Because an injunction based on the likelihood 
of trademark dilution protects against an injury that is speculative and therefore 
immeasurable, the potential cost of this protection outweighs the benefit to plaintiffs.).  
The author agrees. 
183 See Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1574, 
1578 (1999) (mentioning that there were 200 million Internet users by the end of 1998 
and speculating that Internet commerce is likely to reach nearly $300 billion of the U.S. 
GDP by 2002). 
184 Yochai Benkler, How (if at all) to Regulate the Internet: Net Regulation: Taking 
Stock and Looking Forward, 71 U. COLO. L. REV. 1203, 125657 (2000) (Consumers, 
rather than going to a search engine, shopping software, or review site, hunt around for 
http://www.brandname.com, or http://www.brand-name.com, or 
http://www.brandname.net.). 
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law as a means of stripping domain names from their holders
even where those holders are not infringing any trademarks.185 
Whereas a trademark can consist of [a]ny word, name, symbol 
or device, or any combination thereof,186 a domain name can only 
consist of combinations of letters, numbers, and some typographic 
symbols187 up to 63 characters in total length.188  The resultant 
query is how different Internet governance should be in order to 
accommodate the Internets novel circumstances and adapt to 
explosive growth in users, commerce, and political 
stakeholders.189  While courts initially struggled with trademark 
law to encompass disputes over Internet domain names,190 
Congress passed new legislation to partially address the novel 
challenges presented by the new technology. 
Two challenges presented themselves to the courts in resolving 
domain name disputes.  The first scenario involved a legitimate 
dispute between entities with similar product or trade names, 
wherein existing trademark law served as a useful mechanism.  
The other scenario involved persons who traffic in domain names, 
at the expense of trademark holders.191  In 1999, Congress passed 
 
185 Carl Oppedahl, Half a Century of Federal Trademark Protection: The Lanham Act 
Turns Fifty: Analysis and Suggestions Regarding NSI Domain Name Trademark Dispute 
Policy, 7 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 73, 7576 (1996). 
186 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2000). 
187 Sportys Farm L.L.C. v. Sportsmans Mkt., Inc., 202 F.3d 489, 492 (2d Cir. 2000). 
See also id. at 492 n.2 (Certain symbols, such as apostrophes (), cannot be used in a 
domain name. ). 
188 DNS: The Domain Name System, supra note 24. 
189 Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, supra note 183, at 1657. 
190 While entities exist providing arbitration for certain domain name disputes (e.g., 
ICANN, NSI), all such organizations honor a valid judgment from a court. Kevin Eng, 
Breaking Through the Looking Glass: An Analysis of Trademark Rights in Domain 
Names Across Top Level Domains, 6 B.U. J. SCI. & TECH. L. 7, 9 (2000).  Consideration 
of the history, development, and procedure governing such disputes  is outside the scope 
of this Article.  For information regarding such issues, see Stuart D. Levi et al., The 
Domain Name System & Trademarks, in THIRD ANNUAL INTERNET LAW INSTITUTE, 453
63 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, Trademarks, and Literary Prop. Course, Handbook  Series No. 
G0-0051, 1999). 
191 Sportys Farm, 202 F.3d at 495 ([M]any cybersquatters are now careful to no longer 
offer the domain name for sale in any manner that could implicate liability under existing 
trademark dilution case law.). 
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the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act (ACPA)192 to 
address the latter.  Existing trademark law, especially that of 
trademark dilution, remained to address the former. 
A. Federal Cybersquatting Legislation 
Congress enacted the ACPA to stop cybersquatters193 who 
register numerous domain names containing American 
trademarks . . . only to hold them ransom in exchange for 
money.194  Under the ACPA, a plaintiff must first demonstrate 
that the mark is distinctive or famous.195  The plaintiff must then 
demonstrate the domain name in question is identical or 
confusingly similar to the plaintiffs mark.196  A court then 
considers a number of factors to determine if the defendant had a 
bad faith intent to profit from the domain name registration.197  
A court may enjoin the use of the domain name198 and award 
damages to a successful plaintiff.199 
 
192 Pub. L. No. 106-113, §§ 30013010, 113 Stat. 1537, 53743 (codified at 15 U.S.C. § 
1125(d)). 
193 Cybersquatting involves the registration as domain names of well-known 
trademarks by non-trademark holders who then try to sell the names back to the 
trademark owners.  Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick, 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125, 1127 (D. 
Colo. 2000) (quoting Sportys, 202 F.3d at 493). 
194 H.R. REP. NO. 106-412, at 5 (1999). 
195 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I), (I)(B), (II) (2000); see also Sportys Farm, 202 
F.3d at 497. 
196 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(ii)(I); see also Sportys Farm, 202 F.3d at 49798. 
197 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(A)(i); see also Sportys Farm, 202 F.3d at 498.  The ACPA 
lists the nine factors at 15 § 1125(d)(1)(B)(i)(I)(IX).  The ACPA also provides a safe 
harbor: if the defendant believed and had reasonable grounds to believe that the use of 
the domain name was fair use or otherwise lawful. Id. § 1125(d)(1)(B)(ii). See also 
Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 270 (4th Cir. 2001). 
198 The ACPA permits a court to order the defendant to forfeit, cancel or transfer the 
domain name to the plaintiff. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(d)(1)(C); see also Sportys Farm, 202 
F.3d at 500.  The entity in charge of the particular domain name registration must honor a 
valid judgment from a court. See Developments in the Law: The Law of Cyberspace, 
supra note 183. 
199 The Second Circuit stated [a]lthough the [ACPA] uses the term liable, it does not 
follow that damages will be assessed.  Sportys Farm, 202 F.3d at 499500 n.14.  At any 
rate, damages are not available for activity contemplated under the ACPA prior to 
November 17, 1999 (the date of the passage of the ACPA). Id. 
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In Morrison & Foerster LLP v. Wick,200 the U.S. District Court 
for the District of Colorado applied the ACPA to a defendant that 
registered domain names similar to that of the plaintiffs 
trademark.201  Defendant registered http://www.morrisonfoerster. 
com, http://www.morrisonandfoerster.com and other common 
misspellings of the plaintiffs law firm.202  The court granted 
summary judgment for the plaintiff, indicating the defendant had 
no intellectual property rights in the domain names,203 the domain 
names were confusingly similar to the plaintiffs mark204 and the 
defendant had the requisite bad faith under the ACPA.205  Thus, the 
court ordered the defendant to forfeit his interests in the domain 
names, to permanently avoid hindering the law firms ability to 
obtain subject domain names and awarded plaintiff its costs.206 
Cases decided under the ACPA are less complex than those 
ultimately decided under the FTDA because of the bad faith 
element.207  When bad faith is not present and a dispute  arises over 
two potentially legitimate uses of the same domain name, that 
challenges the reach of the FTDA. 
 
200 94 F. Supp. 2d 1125 (D. Colo. 2000). 
201 Id. at 1126. 
202 Id. at 1127.  Defendant also registered http://www.morrisonforester.com and 
http://www.morrisonandforester.com. Id.  Defendant also registered other law firm 
names as domain names, as well as various offensive terms that he linked to the sites he 
registered in a similar manner as the Morrison & Foerster LLP trademark. Id. at 1128. 
203 Id. at 1131.  Interestingly, defendant registered to do business in Colorado under the 
name Morri, Son & Foerster several months after he acquired the domain names in 
question. Id.  The court mentioned this was indicative of the defendants bad faith since 
he did not offer any bona fide services or goods in connection with these domain names. 
Id. 
204 Id. at 1130 (Because ampersands cannot be used in Internet domain names, two 
of . . . [the defendants] domain names are, in all practical aspects, identical to [the 
plaintiffs mark].); see also Brookfield Comms., Inc. v. W. Coast Entmt Corp., 174 
F.3d 1036, 1055 (9th Cir. 1999) (indicating the differences between the mark 
MovieBuff and the moviebuff.com domain name are inconsequential in light of the 
fact that Web addresses are not caps-sensitive). 
205 Morrison & Foerster, 94 F. Supp. 2d at 113032. 
206 Id. at 1136. 
207 See Virtual Works, Inc. v. Volkswagen of Am., Inc., 238 F.3d 264, 269 (4th Cir. 
2001) (stating that the case would be much closer over the domain name 
http://www.vw.net if not for the direct evidence establishing bad faith). 
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B. Domain Name Dilution 
Application of a liberal standard in determining what exactly 
causes dilution most clearly exemplifies the concerns of many 
commentators regarding the creation of the property right in gross.  
The limited means available to distinguish characters on a domain 
name make disputes under the FTDA difficult.  It is inconsistent to 
allow competition to foster in real space while simultaneously 
enjoining it in cyberspace. 
For instance, Time Warner Cable operates a high-speed 
Internet service entitled Roadrunner.208  Warner Brothers 
employs the trademark Road Runner for a popular cartoon 
character and conducts sales of merchandise, television 
programming, etc., under its mark.209  While no infringement and 
dilution dispute existed in real space, Time Warners registration 
and use of the domain name http://www.roadrunner.com brought 
forth such a dispute.210  Although the court dismissed the action 
because Time Warner  failed to demonstrate the requisite harm,211 
the adoption and expansion of the Nabisco courts causation 
framework would potentially grant the Warner Brothers of the 
world a monopoly, to the detriment of legitimate users like Time 
Warner. 
In Toys R Us, Inc. v. Feinberg,212 the U.S. District Court for 
the Southern District of New York considered the claim that the 
domain name http://www.gunsareus.com diluted the Toys R 
Us mark under the FTDA.213  Acknowledging the rights of the 
plaintiff to the family of marks ending in the phrase R Us, the 
court contemplated the safety provided by two characters (a_e) 
 
208 Peter Brown, New Issues in Internet Litigation, in 17TH ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON 
COMPUTER LAW: THE EVOLVING LAW OF THE INTERNETCOMMERCE, FREE SPEECH, 
SECURITY, OBSENITY AND ENTERTAINMENT, at 16971 (PLI Pats., Copyrights, 
Trademarks, & Literary Prop. Course, Handbook Series No. G4-3987, 1997). 
209 Id. 
210 Id. 
211 Id. (citing Roadrunner Computer Sys., Inc. v. Network Solutions, Inc., Civil Docket 
No. 96-413-A (E.D. Va. June 21, 1996)).  Note that the Eastern District of Virginia falls 
under the appellate jurisdiction of the Fourth Circuit. 
212 26 F. Supp. 2d 639 (S.D.N.Y. 1998), vacated by 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999). 
213 Id. at 640. 
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to the defendant.214  Judge Schwartz granted the defendants 
motion for summary judgment, observing: 
Defendants neither make use of the single letter R nor do 
they space or color the letters and words in a manner 
remotely related to plaintiffs.  The name gunsareus 
appears in all lower case letters with no spaces in between 
the letters.  The Court finds that the use of such an 
[I]nternet domain name, without naming the website itself 
Guns R Us or Guns Are Us, will not, as a matter of 
law, blur [or tarnish] the distinctiveness of plaintiffs R 
Us family of marks.215 
The Second Circuit overruled the opinion of Judge Schwartz, 
requiring the judge to apply the law as stated in Nabisco, decided 
in the interim.216 
Other courts have also made similarly tough decisions under 
similar circumstances.217  Due to the potential good faith argument 
on both sides of these issues,218 the action of trademark 
infringement219 (and/or the dilution standard of the Fourth 
Circuit)220 would resolve such disputes in a prudent manner.  The 
good faith disputes over trademarks in Internet domain names 
should, ergo, return to the original purposes of trademark 
 
214 Id. at 643. 
215 Id. at 644. 
216 Toys R Us, Inc. v. Feinberg, 201 F.3d 432 (2d Cir. 1999).  Judge Schwartz, for the 
U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, decided Toys R Us, 26 F. 
Supp. 2d at 639, on October 28, 1998.  The Second Circuit decided Nabisco II, 191 F.3d 
208, 208 (2d Cir. 1999), nearly a year later on August 31, 1999. 
217 See, e.g., Avery Dennison Corp. v. Sumpton, 189 F.3d 868, 873 (9th Cir. 1999) 
(finding triable issue of fact in dispute over the same phrases followed by the top-level 
domain .com for the plaintiff and .net for the defendant); Jews for Jesus v. Brodsky, 
993 F. Supp. 282, 291, 30608 (D.N.J. 1998) (deciding for plaintiff on dilution analysis 
over the domain names http://www.jewsforjesus.org and http://www.jews-for-
jesus.com even though plaintiff only had the right to use the trademark Jews f_r Jesus, 
the _ accounting for a depiction of the star of David); Cardservice Intl, Inc. v. McGee, 
950 F. Supp. 737, 73840 (E.D. Va. 1997), affd, 129 F.3d 1258 (4th Cir. 1997) (holding 
defendant liable under infringement analysis for using the domain name 
http://www.cardservice.com for his company EMSCard Service on the Caprock to 
the detriment of the plaintiff corporation Cardservice International). 
218 Courts should handle cases with bad faith under the ACPA. See supra Part IV.A. 
219 See Reichman, supra note 13 and accompanying text. 
220 Supra Part II.C. 
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protection, preventing confusion as to the source of origin or 
ownership.221 
CONCLUSION 
Trademark protection allows the public to easily identify the 
source of a particular product.222  While courts expand the dilution 
concept further and further, trademark rights become more of a 
property right in gross than a source identifier.223  Dilution law, at 
first envisioned as a means to protect famous marks against uses 
on non-competing products,224 has now become a backup plan in 
case a trademark infringement claim is unsuccessful.225  This 
concept now applies to non-competing, non-identical marks that 
have a speculative possibility of diluting a famous mark.  This 
merely masks the circular reasoning in thinking that the 
distinctive quality of a mark will be diluted by unauthorized use; 
all that has been proven is that a mark will be diluted if it is 
diluted.226 
Although alarming when applied to tangible products and 
services, the liberal application endorsed by the Second Circuit 
becomes even more concerning when applied to Internet domain 
names.  The expansive doctrine, derived from the intricacies in the 
shapes of cheese crackers, truly echoes Professor Lemleys 
prognostication, we . . . seem to be making trademark law for the 
extreme case, but we then apply that law to a large number of run-
of-the-mill trademarks.227  With the limited ability to differentiate 
a finite universe of typewritten characters with a finite length, 
Internet domain names can only be so unique.  Rather than protect 
some notional whittling away of distinctiveness, trademark law as 
 
221 Supra notes 56 and accompanying text. 
222 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1688. 
223 Id. at 1699.  A trademark in gross is unconnected to a particular productto a wide 
variety of owners. Id. 
224 Schechter, supra note 5, at 825 (It is the gradual whittling away or dispersion of the 
identity and hold upon the public mind of the mark or name by its use upon non-
competing goods.) (emphasis added). 
225 Kirkpatrick & Klein, supra note 52, at 57. 
226 Moskin, supra note 1, at 132. 
227 Lemley, supra note 3, at 1697. 
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applied to Internet domain names should be constructed around the 
single question: Is the public confused as to the origin or 
ownership of the domain name? 
The best means to this end is to suspend application of 
trademark dilution to Internet domain names or apply the Fourth 
Circuits dilution causation framework.  Actual, demonstrable 
harm rather than a likelihood of dilution rewards competition, 
protects the public from being misled, and allows for even-handed 
application by a court.  Therefore, Congress should amend the 
FTDA or the Supreme Court should interpret the Act accordingly. 
 
